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Historically, peasant wars, including those of the Taiping Rebellion, have almost always only disrupted social production, rarely developing production or increasing productivity during wartime. However, the modern industry introduced by the Workers' Party accomplished this. The war launched in Wuhan did not cause widespread rural bankruptcy. Although the land reform movement caused short-term turmoil, the countryside quickly recovered after the redistribution of land and the cancellation of a large amount of debt.
Even if the farmers who received land adhered to traditional morality and disagreed with the Labor Party's actions of expropriating the landlords' land, their families would not welcome the landlords back and return their allocated land to them. Moreover, if the landlords were to return to their hometowns, they would not simply take back the land and houses and stop there. The landlords would definitely demand compensation from everyone for the losses they had suffered during that period. The explanation that the farmers' association distributed the land, rather than that you seized it, could not fool the landlords.
Therefore, once land is redistributed in a region, regardless of whether the farmers in that region truly agree with the Labour Party's political ideology, they are politically bound to the Labour Party. Only the Labour Party can protect them from the counterattack of the landlord class, because only the Labour Party in the country has put forward the idea of eliminating the landlord class.
Yuan Shikai, who had been watching the Workers' Party perish, suddenly realized that the Workers' Party was not isolated or besieged because it had offended the landlords and gentry. Although the Workers' Party's expansion was resisted by the gentry and landlords in various places because of its political views, as long as the Workers' Party gained a foothold, no one else could stand firm in that area.
Conversely, the expansion of the Beiyang Army encountered increasing problems. Although the Beiyang Army, derived from the Huai Army system, professionalized through the Xiaozhan training program, its core remained a landlord-armed ideology of scholars leading peasants. Given a century or two of development, the Beiyang Army might have produced a group of Chinese versions of Junker landlords. However, it was now the 20th century, and Europe was already engaging in nationalism and launching total wars; the Beiyang Army was far behind the times. Because the core of the Beiyang Army's formation had not broken away from the landlord-armed mentality, professional officers in the Beiyang Army, as long as they had some money, wanted to buy land in their hometowns and become landlords. Therefore, the Beiyang group stood on the side of the landlord class. They opposed the Labor Party's land revolution program and its political ideal of eliminating the landlord class. However, as soldiers, they admitted that they could not defeat the Wuhan army, so they had to compromise with Wuhan.
However, the Beiyang clique understood that a battle between themselves and Wuhan was inevitable, and this battle would determine who ruled China. Therefore, they spared no effort in expanding their influence. As protectors of the landlord class's interests, the Beiyang clique's expansion was much simpler than that of the Workers' Party. When the Beiyang clique expanded into a region, they didn't eliminate the landlords and gentry; instead, they recruited some of them. Under the oppression in Wuhan, many landlords and gentry were willing to accept the Beiyang clique's protection. However, the Beiyang clique's expansion came at the cost of weakening its internal cohesion. Although the landlord class was a single class, individual landlords had different interests. Landowners' ownership of land was exclusive. The professional officers within the Beiyang clique needed land to become new landlords, while the old landlords joined the Beiyang clique to protect their own land, not to contribute it to the Beiyang clique.
The Beiyang clique's traditional territory was mainly in parts of Hebei and Shandong. Now, the Beiyang clique has not only expanded to most parts of Hebei and Shandong, but also has territory in the Northwest and the Jianghuai region. After the newly added forces in these areas recombined with the old forces within the Beiyang clique, various factions were quickly formed within the Beiyang clique. They fought each other for power, which led to a decline in Yuan Shikai's control over the Beiyang clique.
Therefore, Yuan Shikai urgently needed to reorganize the internal relations of the Beiyang clique, which meant redistributing interests. Rather than adjusting the already divided interests, it was better to find new interests to distribute from the outside. The central and upper-middle Yangtze regions were out of the question; the Beiyang clique couldn't compete with them now. And south of the Yangtze was the aging but still powerful Hunan clique, which Yuan Shikai...
We can only proceed slowly and deliberately, and we cannot push the other side too far. This means that even if we take over the wealthy southeast, there may not be much new benefit to distribute. Only Manchuria outside the Great Wall, due to the selfishness of the Manchus and Russia's defeat, has become a truly unclaimed land. After the Manchus are marginalized, the Beiyang government will not face much obstacle in redistributing the interests in Manchuria.
Japan's attempt to seize southern Manchuria blocked the Beiyang Army's path out of the Great Wall and also blocked Yuan Shikai's path to reorganize the Beiyang Army. Therefore, he had no choice but to confront the Japanese. This is why Yuan Shikai invited Tang Shaoyi and Liang Dunyan to consult on diplomacy. He urgently wanted to know the views of Britain and France on the new peace plan proposed by the Workers' Party in order to decide his next move.
Previously, Britain and France had pressured him to send representatives to the US-led mediation conference. His bottom line was to regain control of Manchuria, of course, with the Beiyang government in control. To this end, he was prepared not to reclaim Port Arthur or recognize Russia's special status in northern Manchuria, as long as he could effectively control Manchuria, especially the most densely populated southern Manchuria.
However, Russia and Japan excluded China from discussing the Manchurian issue at the mediation meeting, which dashed his hopes of sending representatives to the meeting. Japan and Russia had no intention of returning Manchuria to China. They only nominally recognized Manchuria as China's territory, but the two countries divided up spheres of influence on Chinese territory.
However, Britain and France, who had previously persuaded him to participate in the mediation meeting, remained silent about the preliminary peace plan put forward by Japan and Russia, showing no support whatsoever. This greatly puzzled Yuan Shikai, who felt as if he had been betrayed by Britain and France.
Of course, from Britain and France's perspective, they should only support China, not represent China in confronting Japan and Russia. If China opposes the outcome of the negotiations between Japan and Russia and takes substantive action, then they will certainly support it. But if China does not take action itself, it is obviously impossible to expect them to oppose Japan and Russia.
Yuan Shikai could only ask Tang Shaoyi and Liang Dunyan to use their personal connections to inquire about the views of Britain and France on the new peace plan proposed by the Labour Party.
He told the two men, "The Labour Party manipulated Parliament to pass the Four Power Talks resolution. If Britain and France do not respond, then the Council of State will have no choice but to accept Parliament's decision. Of course, I personally disagree with the Labour Party's resolution that angers our allies, but I must obey the will of the people."
Chapter 523 The Japanese's Dilemma
As for the Chinese probing, Minister Satow was indeed unable to comment, as he genuinely did not know what London was thinking. If it weren't for the war, he could have returned to England to enjoy a semi-retired life.
Compared to Sartre, the French Minister to China actually understood what Paris was thinking better. After all, the British still maintained the tradition of private relationships from the old aristocracy, while France had established a professional diplomatic system since Napoleon's time. Simply put, French diplomats had a clear superior-subordinate relationship, and they were more likely to receive clear instructions from their superiors, while British diplomats mainly relied on their personal abilities.
However, the French ambassador to China was unwilling to reveal any information to the Chinese. The British and French governments were actually putting pressure on St. Petersburg to distance itself from Berlin. This highly confidential information could not be told to the Chinese, otherwise, if the Chinese realized that Europe was no longer able to intervene in the situation in East Asia, then the political situation in China would undergo even more unpredictable changes, which was something he certainly did not want to see.
Just as bewildered as Yuan Shikai were Japan's political elites. Although the Japanese considered themselves one of the great powers, especially after defeating the Russian navy, they believed they could stand on equal footing with the European powers. However, Japan was still on the periphery in international diplomatic relations, not much better than China's. Otherwise, Japan would not have started to develop nationalism.
The Japanese pursuit of "leaving Asia and joining Europe" was not just empty slogans in newspapers. As early as 1883, when the Rokumeikan Museum was built, Japan began its diplomatic activities of complete Westernization. Foreign Minister Inoue Kaoru was the standard-bearer of this practice, so much so that a new term appeared in Japanese newspapers: "the Rokumeikan era."
However, this approach of transforming Japan into a "new Westernized empire" was not recognized by the European powers. They refused to revise the unequal treaties with Japan. Following the Normandy landings, Inoue Kaoru resigned, and the attempt to annex Japan and integrate it into Europe failed. Therefore, although the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was the most Westernized official institution, it was still seen as an uncivilized barbarian in the eyes of Europeans, and naturally, it could not obtain any secret intelligence.
The fact that the Labour Party proposed a four-power peace conference—a proposal completely contrary to the interests of the European powers—did not elicit strong pressure from Britain and France towards China was astonishing even to the Japanese government. Even Ito Hirobumi struggled to discern Britain and France's true intentions, only guessing that the antagonism between the major European powers was deepening, and therefore Britain and France did not want to provoke any extreme reaction from China.
However, before Britain and France have determined their positions, Japan cannot make its next choice. Despite the Japanese government's swift and strong protest against the four-nation peace conference, Japan's political elites have not actually considered how Japan should retaliate if the Chinese government rejects Japan's protest.
Why couldn't Japan's political elites make the next move? Because Japan could no longer continue the war. The financial crisis in the United States had completely severed any hope of receiving loans from the US. The Japanese hadn't anticipated that this financial crisis would expose so many problems in the US. Americans were desperately withdrawing their money from banks, and banks had begun to close to combat this wave of bank runs. How could they possibly continue lending to Japan to continue the war?
The financial crisis that erupted in the United States has even begun to affect Europe, as the US is a crucial market for Europe. With the US economy experiencing problems, imports from Europe have begun to decline rapidly, something many Europeans did not anticipate. Before this crisis, no European would have imagined that the US stock market would have anything to do with their lives.
The impact of this financial crisis is so profound and widespread that newspapers in the United States and Europe are focusing on when the crisis will end in the US, while the Japan-Russia peace talks, previously a focus of Western media attention, have become largely ignored. This situation has both advantages and disadvantages for the Japanese government. The advantage is that without international pressure, Japan doesn't need to make many concessions to Russia. The disadvantage is that without international pressure, Japan cannot force Russia to conclude a peace treaty quickly.
For the Japanese upper class, the real hope was to conclude a peace treaty with Russia as soon as possible. The purpose of this war was to drive Russian influence out of Northeast Asia. As for what rewards to be gained from Russia, no one had high expectations. The real rewards of the war were the defenseless Korea and China. However, before the war broke out, domestic public opinion stirred up excessive nationalist sentiment, and after the war broke out, the Japanese navy fought so brilliantly that it gave the public an unrealistic expectation, attempting to replicate another Treaty of Shimonoseki with Russia. Therefore, the peace demands that Komura Juta brought to the Russians were extremely arrogant, to the point that even international public opinion felt that Japan was no longer a victim but another imperialist power.
If this financial crisis had not occurred, under such international pressure, even if Ito Sukeyuki was unwilling, he would have had no choice but to agree to a peace treaty that was completely contrary to the expectations of the people in order to avoid a repeat of the Three Kingdoms' compensation to Liaodong. The United States' intervention in mediating the Far East war had already shown a stance: if Japan did not want peace, then the United States' next actions would be in accordance with international norms.
However, the outbreak of the financial crisis made the United States no longer qualified to intervene in the war. President Roosevelt was no longer concerned with American interests in Asia, but with the stability of the United States. The mediation conference held in the United States had essentially lost its original purpose and turned into a real peace talk between Japan and Russia.
Faced with this international situation, Ito naturally wouldn't take the biggest blame again. Therefore, he demanded that Komura ask Russia to compensate for a portion of the military expenses. The amount of 10 billion rubles was indeed high, but several hundred million rubles should still be paid. At least he could tell the people that he had done his best instead of betraying national interests.
Nicholas II's instructions to Witte were that not a single ruble should be paid in reparations, nor should an inch of Russian territory be lost. In Nicholas II's view, this war was merely a minor setback. If Japan hadn't launched a surprise attack on Russia, Russia wouldn't have lost to Japan. Paying reparations to a yellow-skinned monkey like Japan, which only knew how to attack from behind, would only further tarnish his reputation.
Although Witte could expel Kwantung Province, Sakhalin Island, and Primorsky Krai from Russian territory, after all, for Russia, lands in Asia other than Europe could not be considered true Russian territory. Even if these lands were ceded, they could be taken back in the next war, as had been done in the Russo-Japanese War.
However, the issue of reparations cannot be fooled by the Russian people. No matter the reason, reparations are reparations. The prestige of the Tsarist government, which was already crumbling due to the defeat in the war, might really collapse completely because of the reparations to Japan. Coupled with the continuous worker and peasant movements at home, it is not impossible for a revolution similar to the French Revolution to occur in Russia.
Therefore, the peace terms that Witte and Komura Juta had initially reached in late September were overturned by Ito Sukeyuki, and Witte's suggestion to give the Japanese some reparations was rejected by Nicholas II. The peace negotiations between Russia and Japan fell into a stalemate. However, this stalemate was not in Japan's interest. The Wuhan Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Committee and the Chita Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Soviet issued a joint statement, and the Workers' Party promoted the proposal of a four-nation peace conference. In essence, this changed the model of mediation of the Far East war dominated by the West and transformed it into a model of joint consultation among relevant countries in Northeast Asia.
It should be said that the Japanese are not incapable of understanding the meaning of consultations between relevant neighboring countries. Northeast Asian affairs are resolved through consultations among the relevant neighboring countries themselves, which at least prevents interference from external powers in Northeast Asian affairs. This is obviously beneficial to the relevant countries in Northeast Asia. However, Japan cannot accept that China occupies a leading position in the Four-Party Talks.
The Republic of Chita was clearly established with Chinese support, while North Korea has always maintained its existence by engaging in a balancing diplomacy between Japan and Russia. This war caused Russia to lose most of its voice in Northeast Asia. If North Korea does not find a powerful ally to rely on as soon as possible, how can it resist the pressure exerted by Japan? The four-party talks proposed by the Workers' Party will inevitably receive a positive response from the North Koreans. Even though they were hostile to their former colonial power, they now have no choice but to rely on it again.
Therefore, the so-called four-nation peace talks are essentially a joint effort by China, Russia, and North Korea to confront Japan. It would be strange if Japan could accept this. Unless Japan becomes the leader of the four-nation talks, then Japan leading the four Northeast Asian countries against interference from external powers would be somewhat interesting, but Japanese diplomats are unlikely to do so.
Thus, Japan's political elites have fallen into a dilemma: they cannot rely on their own strength to determine peace in Northeast Asia; they cannot accept the existing international order to end the war; and if they want to establish a new international order by integrating the forces of Northeast Asia, then the opportunity has been seized by the Chinese.
Ira Yukihiro's choice seemed not much different from Yuan Shikai's; before ascertaining the true intentions of Britain and France regarding the post-war Far East, inaction was preferable to action. Of course, Japan's political elites were not entirely ignorant of European affairs. At least the navy was aware of the growing antagonism between Britain and France and Germany, which had divided Europe into two camps. The army, meanwhile, dispatched Akashi Motoji as a military attaché at the Russian legation to gather intelligence and support the Russian workers' movement.
Akashi Motoji had actually sent a telegram to Tokyo in late September. In the telegram, Yoshichi Army stated that Théophile Delcassé, the French minister to St. Petersburg, had openly criticized some of Nicholas II's actions at banquets. However, the army did not pay much attention to this and did not exchange intelligence with the navy. Therefore, this news did not arouse the imagination of the Japanese political elite.
As the former French Foreign Minister, Delcasé was a staunch advocate of allying with Russia and opposing Germany. After the Krupp Telegraph Affair, he was forced to resign under pressure from Berlin. However, his influence on France's diplomatic thinking did not diminish. In fact, his forced resignation strengthened the French people's recognition of the advocacy of allying with Russia and opposing Germany.
Therefore, Delcasser's appointment as Minister to Russia was not merely to appease this French political elite, but also to put into practice the advocacy of an alliance with Russia against Germany. Delcasser, wanting an alliance with Russia, could not openly criticize the Tsar, unless the Tsar had already abandoned the path of an alliance with France against Germany. By understanding Delcasser's position, one can analyze his statements to deduce the French government's views on the Tsar and Russia, and thus understand why France remained silent on the Labour Party's proposal for a four-power peace talks. France's attitude also reflects Britain's attitude.
However, Japanese politics has not yet shaken off the habits of the feudal era, regarding intelligence as their own magic weapon and having no desire to communicate with others. Therefore, although clues were presented to the Japanese, the Japanese, with their big eyes, turned a blind eye to them.
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Chapter 524 European Covert War
On October 7, Tsar Nicholas II sent a secret telegram to Wilhelm II, declaring the Russo-German alliance agreement signed earlier in February on Björk Island invalid. This secret telegram was sent after being reviewed by the French minister to Russia, Delcassé. This was precisely the reason for the silence of Britain and France regarding the four-power conference proposed by the Labour Party, which puzzled Yuan Shikai and the Japanese.
After the Trans-Siberian Railway was cut off by Chinese troops, Britain and France believed the war had reached its end. Pro-British and French forces within Russia also abandoned their support for the war in the Far East. This was the root cause of Count Witte's return to preside over peace negotiations with Japan. However, Nicholas II did not completely abandon the war effort. Although he could no longer obtain war loans from Britain and France, the Germans were still willing to support him. Wilhelm I only needed Nicholas I to participate in the initial negotiations of the Alliance and restore the Three Emperors' League. Nicholas I and Wilhelm I communicated via secret telegrams and finally met in early August at Vyborg Bay in Finland.
However, this meeting was not merely a matter of personal will between the two emperors. Neither side brought political advisors or foreign ministers. The first clause of the agreement stated that if either European nation attacked one of the parties, the other party should provide assistance with all of its army and navy forces.
When Nicholas I returned to St. Petersburg with the draft of the initial agreement on a German-Russian alliance, his courtiers, upon learning of the meeting's contents, immediately rose up in opposition. The agreement's targeting was far too obvious; it was a preliminary alliance between Russia and Germany against Britain. Since only Britain had the power to embolden Russia and Germany, and Austria-Hungary wouldn't dare provoke Russia without German support, this was essentially a unilateral alliance agreement with Russia supporting Germany, even worse than the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. Apart from the Far Eastern faction, which was already nearly bankrupt, pro-British and pro-French courtiers and those advocating Pan-Slavism resolutely opposed the validity of the initial agreement.
This agreement will prevent Russia's expansion in the Balkans, which is intolerable to Pan-Slavists, because if Russia gains control of the entire Balkan Peninsula, it will have a land route to the Mediterranean, even if it doesn't get the Straits.
In an effort to stop Nicholas II from going his own way, these opponents leaked the contents of the agreement to the French minister to Russia, Delcassé. Soon, the British also learned of this from the French, and Britain and France began to put pressure on Nicholas II, demanding that he choose sides between Germany and Britain and France.
The pressure exerted by Britain and France on Nicholas II was certainly not merely verbal threats. On the one hand, Britain and France cut off loans to Russia and began pressuring Russia to repay them; on the other hand, they began supporting Russian liberals, believing that Russia should implement reforms. Before August, although worker and peasant movements were erupting across Russia, they were not interconnected and therefore could not shake the Tsarist government's rule; at most, they could only impact it. As Lenin criticized the Mensheviks, at this time of escalating worker and peasant movements in Russia, the Social Democratic Party should have stood among the masses to establish a provisional government and seize the leadership of the revolution.
Without the leadership of a unified revolutionary regime, scattered mass movements cannot contend with an organized autocratic government. Of course, the Mensheviks refused to join and establish a provisional government because the Russian Social Democratic Party (SDP) was not ranked highly among the various socialist parties in Russia. The largest socialist party was the Socialist Revolutionary Party (SRRP). Compared to the SDP's moderate approach to struggle, the SRRP was much more radical. They not only advocated armed struggle but also actively engaged in terrorism, assassinating Russian officials. Therefore, the SRRP was the Tsarist government's primary target.
Compared to the more lenient treatment of the Social Democratic Party, where its leaders were either exiled to the frontier or banished from the country, the Tsarist government treated the Socialist Revolutionaries with the death penalty upon capture. Therefore, the Mensheviks did not want the Social Democratic Party to suffer the same fate as the Socialist Revolutionaries and become an object of Tsarist dictatorship.
Moreover, those who control a large amount of social resources are bourgeois liberals, not socialists. Unlike the various socialist parties, which are on the margins of society and in the illegal zone, bourgeois liberals occupy the middle class of Russian society. They have wealth but lack the political power to protect it, so they urgently hope that Russia will transform into a Western European country, limit the power of the aristocracy, and defend individual rights.
Russian socialist democrats, including the Shviks, hoped that these bourgeois liberals would stand up against the Tsar, because only the social resources they possessed could rival the power of the Tsarist government, and European capitalism was more likely to accept Russia as a capitalist country.
However, the bourgeois liberals did not have the courage to rush to the front of the crowd. After the Tsar's army fired machine guns at the crowds who went to the palace square to petition, these liberals, although disgusted with the Tsar, also felt a real fear of the unlimited power of an autocratic monarch. They would not challenge the Tsar's authority until they saw the possibility of suppressing this unlimited power.
However, as discontent with Nicholas II spread among the British and French elites within the Russian upper class, Russian bourgeois liberals finally found a pillar of support. With French backing, they began to launch a massive critique of the government in their controlled newspapers, attributing the defeats in the Far East wars to the corruption of a segment of government officials and openly mocking the royal family.
For example, a joke circulated among the citizens of St. Petersburg: A Grand Duke held a high-ranking position in the navy. When news of the Battle of Cam Ranh Bay reached St. Petersburg, his mistress mocked him. Enraged, the Grand Duke retorted: "The money I've spent on you is enough to buy a warship." His mistress, not to be outdone, replied: "The cannon fire you've done on me is enough to sink a warship."
The prevalence of such jokes greatly diminished the sanctity of the Romanov dynasty, made the nobles appear as incompetent, corrupt, and lecherous laborers, and also undermined the legitimacy of the Tsarist government.
In addition to launching an attack on the Tsarist autocracy through public opinion, bourgeois liberals also devoted considerable resources to uniting workers' and peasants' movements across the country. As a result, starting at the end of September, a nationwide general political strike began. Large-scale worker strikes occurred in St. Petersburg and Moscow, and the working class in various cities began to unite. For example, after a city-wide general strike broke out in Moscow, the workers on the Moscow-Kazan Railway quickly responded, rapidly spreading the workers' strike movement in Europe to the frontier regions and stimulating the workers' movement in Siberia and Central Asia.
By early October, more than 175 million factory and railway workers had participated in the nationwide political general strike. In addition, peasants, students and intellectuals from all over the country had joined the strike, and soldiers in some areas had also revolted. It seemed that an unprecedented revolution was about to break out in Russia, and Nicholas II finally gave in to Britain and France.
On October 7, Nicholas II rescinded the Björk Agreement on the grounds that France did not recognize the Russo-German alliance. This was undoubtedly a heavy blow to Wilhelm II, as the German political elite believed that Wilhelm II and Nicholas II's unilateral signing of the agreement was unconstitutional.
Of course, if Nicholas II had been willing to abide by the Björk Agreement, then with the support of the military, Wilhelm II could have suppressed the government's discontent. However, Nicholas II's breach of the agreement made Wilhelm II's actions seem somewhat foolish, and the military was unlikely to support Wilhelm II for an abandoned agreement.
The Hohenzollern dynasty did not enjoy the same prestige in Germany as the Romanov dynasty did in Russia. After all, Wilhelm I was crowned German Emperor, not German Emperor; the former was more of a personal honorary title than a supreme monarch.
In fact, Wilhelm II's power over the German Empire came from his position as President of the Federal Republic of Germany, not as Emperor of Germany. The Imperial Constitution did not grant him absolute monarchical power, but he could exercise monarchical power through the appointment and dismissal of the State Secretary. This is why the Björk Agreement was unconstitutional in Germany, because Wilhelm II overstepped his authority.
The rapid development of capitalism in Germany during the last three decades of the 19th century led to the rapid expansion of both the German bourgeoisie and the proletariat. Except for Prussia, which remained conservative due to the dominance of the Junkers, other states within Germany experienced ideological liberalization. The bourgeoisie wanted to gain more power, while the proletariat desired a dignified life rather than becoming new slaves in factories.
The outbreak of the European economic crisis in 1900 further fueled the spread of democratic and socialist ideas in Germany. Some German intellectuals even turned their attention to the existence of the German Empire, attempting to transform it into a people's republic. The parliamentary struggles in Germany in 1905-1906 demonstrated that this ideology had become a real political force.
Wilhelm II's attempt to rebuild the Three Emperors' Alliance was not only to counter Britain and France, but also to defend the imperial system. As long as Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Russia maintained their monarchies, the small Eastern European countries between them would also maintain their monarchies, and European bourgeois liberalism would be unable to become a widespread European democratic movement.
However, Nicholas II's breach of the treaty not only thwarted Wilhelm II's efforts to restore the Three Emperors' League, but also provided German bourgeois liberals with an excellent excuse to further restrict their power. While Wilhelm II was entangled with domestic bourgeois liberals and unable to attend to other matters, new changes occurred in East Asia.
News of the general political strike, the city-wide strike in Moscow, and the strike by railway workers in Moscow and Kazan quickly spread from Wuhan to Chita, and from Chita to towns throughout the Far East and to the Russian army. On October 9th, the Russian troops stationed from Manchuria to Angangxi, persuaded by the Chita Workers', Peasants', and Soldiers' Soviet, revolted. In the region north of the Heilongjiang River, the Chita Soviet's rule extended from the Shilka River basin to the Zeya River basin. The more than 300,000 Russian troops in Manchuria were now truly isolated, besieged in the Harbin area. Bo Cixiang's troops, located northwest of Changchun, quickly received instructions from Wuhan. He formally rejected the conditional surrender offered by Kurobatjin and issued an ultimatum demanding that the Russian troops stationed in Harbin unconditionally lay down their arms and surrender to the Chinese army within 48 hours. After this time, Russian officers would not be treated well. Fu Cixiang also relayed the ultimatum to the Beiyang and Japanese armies.
Chapter 525 The Three Kingdoms of the Far East (1)
Siping was the fifth station on the South Manchurian Railway built by Tsarist Russia. Like many newly emerging towns on the Chinese Eastern Railway, this town only appeared after the railway was built. With the railway as the dividing line, the west side of the railway was a completely newly built street, while the east side was the original natural villages. More than 9 kilometers west of the railway was the old Siping Town. Therefore, the fifth station was called Siping Station.
When Tsarist Russia built Siping, it was only to develop the local agricultural resources. Before the railway was built, the East and West Liao Rivers were located dozens of kilometers to the west of Siping, which provided an advantage for water transport. As a result, the local agriculture was relatively developed. In summer, the area was covered with dense green fields of sorghum and soybeans, which was a typical scene in the region.
The Northeast is a vast and sparsely populated region. After the Qing Dynasty opened the Willow Palisade, it wasn't difficult for people from the interior of China to migrate and develop the area. There was no shortage of fertile land to sustain life. However, the climate in the Northeast is much harsher than in the interior. Snow can start falling as early as October or November, and temperatures plummet after snowfall. Therefore, fuel and warm clothing are essential for survival in the Northeast.
In the agricultural economy era, fuel could be obtained by cutting down trees around residential areas. However, residents in the north generally could not provide their own warm clothing, because textiles were not only a skilled trade but also a labor-intensive job. This meant that northern residents had to obtain cheap clothing from the market.
Therefore, the biggest problem hindering the development of Northeast China was not manpower or land, but transportation. Without a convenient transportation network, the sorghum and soybeans you grew couldn't be transported out and would only be kept at home as fuel. This is not nonsense, but a reality. After Tsarist Russia built the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway, the population of North Manchuria increased several times in a short period of time, and the price of land along the railway lines began to soar. The population and resources of Northeast China began to concentrate near the railways.
Therefore, it is clear to everyone that the key to controlling Manchuria lies in controlling the railway. Whoever controls the railway controls the towns and cities along the railway line, and whoever controls these towns controls the surrounding countryside. This is the root cause of Japan's desire to seize the South Manchurian Railway and the Western powers' attempt to internationalize the Manchurian Railway.
After Japan joined the war, the defeat in the Battle of Liaoyang led Tsarist Russia to attempt to maintain the front line between Siping and Changchun. As a result, Tsarist Russia used a lot of manpower to expand barracks in Siping. However, because the Chinese army directly threatened Changchun, Tsarist Russia eventually abandoned this plan. However, the expanded Siping was favored by the Japanese and became the headquarters and logistics center of the Japanese Manchurian Army.
After Bozisang conveyed the ultimatum issued to Kurobordkin to the Japanese Manchurian Army Headquarters, it immediately provoked dissatisfaction among Japanese generals, including Kodama. At a military conference held in response to the ultimatum, Major General Iguchi Shogo first expressed doubt about the Chinese army's ability to attack Harbin. He argued that the main force of the Beiyang Army was mostly in the Jinzhou and Shengjing areas, busy vying with them for control of southern Manchuria. Fu Cixiang only had a little over two regular divisions; the rest were local militias and bandits. He believed that attacking Harbin with such a rabble was suicidal.
However, Staff Officer Tian Zhongyi had a different opinion: "If this were the early stages of the war, Fu Cixiang's actions would be suicidal. Even a month ago, when our Imperial Army combined its full strength from both the north and south, we could only besiege the Russian army north of Harbin and Changchun and then try to induce them to surrender."
But the situation is different now. The Russian army knows that it has lost the war. Kuropatkin has even offered us a conditional surrender, which means that the Russian army has lost its morale and no longer wants to fight.
Of course, if it were just this, Fu Cixiang's attempt to force the unconditional surrender of hundreds of thousands of Russian troops with a few disorganized groups would be going too far and might even provoke the Russian army to fight. The problem now is that the rebellion in the Russian Far East and the anti-Tsarist demonstrations within Russia have created divisions within the Russian army.
Kuropatkin surrendered to us because he had lost control of the army and was trying to use our power to suppress the Russian soldiers who were dissatisfied with the Tsar. Therefore, the biggest problem for the Russian army in Harbin now is not that they are surrounded by us, but the conflict between the soldiers and officers within their ranks.
Bo Cixiang didn't need to deal with hundreds of thousands of Russian troops; he only needed to help those Russian soldiers resist a few thousand or tens of thousands of Russian officers. After the joint declaration reached between the Chita Republic and Wuhan, I don't think he couldn't do it with the support of the Chita Republic. After all, the fact that the Russian troops along the route from Manchuria to Angangxi betrayed the Tsar already demonstrated that the Chita Republic had sufficient influence over the Russian troops in Manchuria.
Therefore, I don't believe Fu Cixiang's ultimatum to the Russians was just bluster, but a genuine warning. If we stand idly by, the Chinese will unceremoniously seize Harbin, and once those hundreds of thousands of Russian troops are under the control of the Chita Republic, whether they advance westward or remain in the Far East, we will be caught in a pincer movement between China and Russia.
Although Tanaka Giichi was a graduate of the Army Junior School, his participation in the Hagi Rebellion severed his ties with the military. Both the Hagi Rebellion and the Satsuma Rebellion were samurai uprisings triggered by discontent among the old samurai class with the new government's reform policies. In an effort to suppress these old samurai, the Japanese government temporarily abolished the Army Junior School, a pathway for the children of old samurai to enter the military.
However, Tanaka Giichi was ultimately from Choshu, and the intricate connections between the military and the old samurai class could not be severed. Therefore, after the age of 20, Tanaka once again had the opportunity to enter the Army Academy, re-establishing his ties with the military. After abandoning the privileged ideas of the samurai class, Tanaka excelled in the army, not only performing well in staff work but also in intelligence work against Russia, thus quickly becoming a rising star of the Choshu faction.
Kodama greatly appreciated Tanaka's work as a staff officer; at least in the battles of Liaoyang and Fengtian, Tanaka's judgments were accurate, only becoming somewhat conservative towards the end of the Fengtian campaign. At that time, Tanaka advocated abandoning the pursuit of the Russian army, which aligned with Kodama's thinking. He didn't want the Russians to completely withdraw from Manchuria, as this would lead to a direct conflict between Japan and China over Manchuria.
However, the audacity of the Chinese exceeded Kodama's expectations. What surprised him even more was that the Chinese would attempt to cut off the Trans-Siberian Railway via Outer Mongolia, completely disrupting Kodama's vision of the post-war Northeast Asian landscape. Although many questioned Tanaka's actions in preventing his army from pursuing the Russian forces after the Battle of Fengtian, Kodama believed that this was not Tanaka's fault, but rather an unexpected turn of events by the Chinese.
Kodama sees it as a good thing that Tanaka was able to boldly refute Major General Iguchi Shogo's assessment at this meeting. It shows that Tanaka wasn't discouraged by the Chinese's actions; on the contrary, he's begun to readjust his views on them. This is what the Chinese mean by "learning from one's mistakes."
Kodama interrupted the others' questions about Tanaka and turned to Commander-in-Chief Oyama Iwao beside him, saying, "Tanaka's words are not without reason. We cannot turn a blind eye to the actions of the Chinese. If the dozens of Russian troops in Harbin fall into the hands of the Republic of Chita, then we will really be in a dilemma."
New loans are no longer available abroad, and the people at home are eager for an early end to the war. Furthermore, winter is approaching in Manchuria. If the Manchurian issue cannot be resolved quickly, the war will inevitably continue into next spring, which will be a heavy burden on our country. Therefore, we must resolve this war as soon as possible to facilitate discussions with the Chinese regarding post-war interests.
The usually taciturn Oyama Iwao glanced at Kodama and realized that Kodama's resolve was also beginning to waver. Before the war, Kodama had never considered discussing postwar issues with the Chinese because he didn't believe the Chinese army could cause any trouble for the Japanese army. But now, Kodama believed that the Chinese were qualified to discuss postwar interests with Japan.
Oyama-kun agreed with Kodama's idea. China was now qualified to discuss the distribution of postwar interests. If Japan ignored this, the Chinese would produce something like a joint statement with the Republic of Chita. This joint statement was essentially a counterattack against the Russo-Japanese peace talks. The Chinese had demonstrated through their actions that even if Japan and Russia reached some agreement, peace in the Far East would not come.
Japan could negotiate peace with Russia without China, and China could also cooperate with the rebel forces in Russia without Japan. Thus, before the war was over, the confrontation between Japan and China had already emerged.
Although Ooyama-kun thought this way, as the Commander-in-Chief of the Manchurian Army and the decision-maker for army strategy, he could not change his stance as quickly as Kodama. Therefore, he said to his subordinates in a rigid tone: "Whether Fu Cixiang can force the Russian army to surrender unconditionally is still unknown. We don't need to speculate too much."
However, Bozhi's act of issuing an ultimatum to the Russian army without authorization has violated the agreement between Japan and China to advance and retreat together. We must lodge a protest with the Chinese command as soon as possible and demand that the Chinese command restrain the discipline of the Chinese army.
Secondly, since the Chinese broke the agreement of joint advance and retreat between the Japanese and Chinese armies first, can't we make separate contact with Kuropatkin? I want to know how many troops Kuropatkin still controls, and if he gets our support, is he capable of quelling the mutiny within the army?
In addition, inform Okuyasu, Nozumichi, and Tamura Iyozo about the Chinese actions, and how confident they are in uniting with a portion of the Russian army to control the situation in the Harbin area should a three-way conflict between Japan, China, and Russia break out.
Oyama Iwao chose to continue along the same path as the pre-war army plan, which naturally did not encounter opposition from most people. However, he had in fact given his subordinates the opportunity to overturn this path. If the Russians could not control the situation or if the generals of the Northern Route Army raised objections, then this plan would fail.
Being forced to change course due to an inability to execute the plan is better than having to change course due to a miscalculation. The latter undoubtedly admits to their inconsistency, which is unacceptable to the Choshu faction generals, since they have been able to maintain their leadership of the army because they have always been on the path of victory.
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Chapter 526 The Three Kingdoms of the Far East (2)
After the Battle of Liaoyang, St. Petersburg had actually lost confidence in Kuropatkin's command abilities and intended to have General Oscar Gripenberger replace Kuropatkin as the commander-in-chief of the Far East war. However, several other generals in Manchuria also wanted the position and were not fond of General Gripenberger. Therefore, they hindered General Gripenberger in the Battle of Shahe, preventing him from taking over the position of supreme commander of the Manchurian army with a victory.
Because of the power struggles among these generals, coupled with the increasingly unfavorable situation in the Far East, Kuropatkin miraculously managed to retain his position. Of course, Kuropatkin knew in his heart that his generals had not united because of the unfavorable situation, but because they could not see any chance of turning the tide and therefore no longer sought his position in order to avoid being blamed.
Why did Kurosutkin know that these generals had not united? Because after retreating to Harbin, the generals mainly argued in their meetings about who should take responsibility for the defeat in the war, and almost no one cared about how to solve the current predicament.
Of course, after the defeat in the Battle of Fengtian, Kuropatkin believed that the war should end. Even with more forces sent from Europe, the war could at best result in a stalemate with China and Japan; a reversal of victory was impossible. The defeat in the Battle of Fengtian had completely eroded the fighting spirit of the Russian army, while the fighting spirit of the Chinese and Japanese soldiers and civilians had surged. Considering diplomatic factors, Russia could not change its unfavorable position in the Far East unless it deployed all its forces there, which was clearly impossible.
The problems that Kuropatkin could see were also visible to the other generals. Therefore, everyone was well aware that Russia had already lost the war, and continuing would only increase Russia's losses without any chance of improvement. However, for the sake of the Tsar's face, no one dared to state this fact to St. Petersburg. Unless Nicholas II himself realized the error of his ways and gave up, no one wanted to be the crow that brought the bad news.
Since the war is irreversible, we have now entered the tedious period of waiting for the war to end. There is nothing left for everyone to do except shirk responsibility. Moreover, Kuropatkin and these Russian generals do not believe that China and Japan can encircle and annihilate dozens of Russian troops that have gathered together. As long as the Trans-Siberian Railway remains open, China and Japan can only fight the Russian army in Harbin. The Russian army's defensive fortifications are no worse than those of the Asians.
However, none of them anticipated that the Chinese would be able to launch an attack from Outer Mongolia to cut off the Trans-Siberian Railway, and that the Russian people would actually launch strikes and demonstrations against the Tsarist autocracy. Faced with the threat of revolution at home, the Russian Far East army not only truly lost domestic support, but also saw the emergence of public opinion within the Russian army that favored ending the war, and even some that favored revolution.
Faced with the risk of a revolution erupting among hundreds of thousands of Russian troops, the generals who had been attacking each other finally put aside their prejudices about their respective objectives. Under Kuropatkin's leadership, they came to the conclusion that they clearly could not suppress the risk of revolution in the army on their own, because after a series of defeats and being cut off from Europe, the Russian Far East Army had in fact lost its complete organization.
As a tool of state violence, the military erases the social attributes of soldiers from the moment they are conscripted and reassigns them with the special attributes of soldiers. While the military organization is functioning normally, soldiers cannot regain their social attributes. Only after the military organization begins to disintegrate do soldiers, now free from organizational control, begin to regain their social attributes.
This is the root cause of why the proletariat, after entering the army, would obey orders to shoot at civilians who are also proletarians. When soldiers fire, they have already detached themselves from their class attributes and become part of the entire state machine. As long as this machine can still function, soldiers cannot disobey orders.
This is why the proletariat of various countries fought each other in the trenches during World War I and could not unite to resist the bourgeoisie. There was a brief period during World War I when soldiers regained their social attributes, such as the Christmas ceasefire. However, the bourgeois state apparatus quickly eliminated these soldiers' brief awakening.
Some have attempted to use the mutual slaughter of the proletariat on the battlefield to prove that proletarian unity is unreliable, but in fact, this only proves that the proletariat cannot achieve self-liberation before national and ethnic identities are eliminated. So-called left-wing nationalism and left-wing patriotism are nonexistent, as absurd as the Nazis' self-proclaimed National Socialism.
The Russian Empire mobilized a large number of reserve soldiers to launch the Far East war. These soldiers were not well organized to begin with, and after suffering a series of defeats, the organizational system of the Russian Far East army was on the verge of collapse. The reason why the Russian army was able to hold on to Harbin was because the state machinery of Tsarist Russia still existed, and most of the Russian soldiers came from the border area between Europe and Asia. They were unfamiliar with the Far East and could not find their way home even if they wanted to escape. They could only wait in Harbin for the war to end.
However, the news of the Chita Uprising and the anti-Tsarist movement within Russia meant that, for Russian soldiers cut off from Europe, the Tsarist Russian state apparatus was on the verge of collapse. The already poorly organized Russian army disintegrated further, and many soldiers began to awaken to their own social attributes.
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